Waaaay back in the spring of this year, I posted a rather modest post about moral relativism (which had a surprising amount of traffic). Given the arrival of some new champions of moral relativism in our comment boxes, I thought I'd open the idea up again... and give the poor, overburdened (but excellent) "Abortion" thread some room to breathe!
One case in point: our honoured guest, Mr. Robert Schwartz, once wrote, in reply to our esteemed host:
Indeed: I find it mildly amusing that in a single breath you confess reluctance to strike up a contract with me due to your supposition that I am untrustworthy, yet simultaneously assert that I'm honest about my position!
That's as good a starting place as any.
Moral relativism, when taken to its logical conclusion (or applied consistently), cannot help but collapse on itself, in a sense--especially when the proponent also claims to hold to some sort of moral code. In this case: the fact that a relativist could be up-front and honest about his relativism is (while that honesty is a good thing, in and of itself) something of an "accident of the moment". Let's grant that Mr. X, a moral relativist, currently holds himself to a standard of "honesty", which we'll assume (for now) means, "I will not intentionally deceive, and/or give false information." Given the starting premise (of absolute moral relativism), I personally see nothing that would prevent Mr. X from dropping that "honesty" standard like a hot potato, should the right combination of factors/incentives move him sufficiently... and there's no assurance that Mr. X will even be "good" enough to let others know of his new-found rejection of truth-telling and honesty.
In short: if the only reason Mr. X is "honest" is that it pleases him to be so at the moment (and if there's no reason to suppose that this won't change for whatever reason, at any time), then I really can't blame anyone else for not being willing to enter into a contract with Mr. X; his honesty is "an accident of the moment", which is as fickle as would be a liar from the start.
Ironically enough, this "accidental attitude of honesty" is also only recognizable by reliance on an objective standard of truth! A true relativist would not balk at being skeptical of the very perceptions of reality of others (i.e. taking a knife and stabbing an innocent child on the street is actually murdering a real, externally-existing person, rather than being an exercise of a somewhat energetic day-dream within his head).
Question: if you embrace moral relativism, then why do you not also embrace radical relativism (e.g. solipsism--the idea that you are the only person whose existence is certain, and that all other persons/things are more-or-less persistent hallucinations, figments of your vibrant imagination, etc.)? There's no such thing as "evidence against solipsism", any more than there's evidence against "absolute moral relativism", right?
P.S. Robert, sorry about losing track of so many of your points, and (good/challenging) questions! The frenzy at work/home has subsided somewhat, but I'm still picking up a dizzying number of pieces; I'll try to get to some of your earlier comments if I can, but feel free to re-ask them if I "space out" about them for too long...
28 comments:
*cracks knuckles* Let's get this show on the road!
Let's grant that Mr. X, a moral relativist, currently holds himself to a standard of "honesty", which we'll assume (for now) means, "I will not intentionally deceive, and/or give false information."
Let's instead start out by not assuming things, eh? I have no capacity for declaring that I will not intentionally deceive. In point of fact, and despite my self-proclaimed devotion to honesty, I do deceive others from time to time. Human as I am, I am known to err in judgment, or otherwise fail to exert my will in my efforts to follow my own moral compass.
Hence, what this "Mr. X" will say is, "Intentionally deceiving is unethical." I.e., part of the ethical code of conduct I have constructed for myself depicts intentional deception as a no-no.
Thus, when I do intentionally deceive others and subsequently catch myself in the act, I note that I have in fact broken my own ethical code. As a result, I experience emotions such as guilt and regret. This in turn prompts me to make amends, such as apologizing, correcting the misstatement I made, and doing some introspection to discover why it is that I permitted myself to stray off of my course.
Given the starting premise (of absolute moral relativism), I personally see nothing that would prevent Mr. X from dropping that "honesty" standard like a hot potato, should the right combination of factors/incentives move him sufficiently... and there's no assurance that Mr. X will even be "good" enough to let others know of his new-found rejection of truth-telling and honesty.
True. You have no reason whatsoever to trust any claims I make regarding ethics. Nor do you have any reason to assume that I will not alter or even eliminate altogether my ethical system. Ultimately, you have no reason to trust anything I ever say or do whatsoever.
The same, however, can be said of any person. All individuals, possessed of free will, have the capacity to perform any action they wish, whenever they wish it. Ethical systems, absolute, relative or whatever, have no bearing whatsoever on this fact. Humans can choose. And choose they will. Thus I, Mr. X, in turn have no inherent reason to trust anything that YOU say and do as regards ethics. And so forth.
In short: if the only reason Mr. X is "honest" is that it pleases him to be so at the moment (and if there's no reason to suppose that this won't change for whatever reason, at any time), then I really can't blame anyone else for not being willing to enter into a contract with Mr. X; his honesty is "an accident of the moment", which is as fickle as would be a liar from the start.
And in turn, you, too are honest only insofar as the "accident of the moment," for precisely the same reason. Whether or not your claims of an existence of a universal ethical standard are valid or not, your *adherence* to such a standard cannot be absolute, as you are a human being. You can change your mind. And I have no inherent reason to trust that you will not.
In fact, I have no reason to trust that you haven't already.
Ironically enough, this "accidental attitude of honesty" is also only recognizable by reliance on an objective standard of truth! A true relativist would not balk at being skeptical of the very perceptions of reality of others (i.e. taking a knife and stabbing an innocent child on the street is actually murdering a real, externally-existing person, rather than being an exercise of a somewhat energetic day-dream within his head).
As a true relativist, I indeed do not balk at being skeptical of the very perceptions of reality. There were days in which some folks were under the unfortunate impression that races of human beings other than caucasian were not people deserving of rights, but rather property to be owned. As such, taking the life of a slave would in turn be interpreted by these people not as murder, but as destruction of property. That's what they believed; that's how they perceived the world. That others perceived otherwise then, and perceive otherwise now, is irrelevant.
Question: if you embrace moral relativism, then why do you not also embrace radical relativism (e.g. solipsism--the idea that you are the only person whose existence is certain, and that all other persons/things are more-or-less persistent hallucinations, figments of your vibrant imagination, etc.)? There's no such thing as "evidence against solipsism", any more than there's evidence against "absolute moral relativism", right?
I am aware of the philosophy of solipsism and the fact that by its very nature, it cannot be disproved. My response to this is simple: Who cares? Perhaps I am a brain in a vat being fed information. The reality with which I've been presented may as well be the actual reality for all the difference it makes to me. For all intents and purposes, the distinction is meaningless to me.
Thus, I've arbitrary decided, of my own volition, to consider the world that I perceive to be reality. The alternative is boring.
Hm. Good points, but I have a few rejoinders:
There seems, at least in my eyes, to be a rather stark difference between someone who acknowledges and adheres to a universal moral standard (i.e. the only expected way for him to commit dishonesty would be to "fall" through weakness--and, God willing, to repent of that subsequently and amend his life), and someone who denies both the universal moral standard and any obligation to adhere to it; the latter could commit dishonesty either by "falling" or by giving himself advance permission to do so (with no assurance of repentance--since even the word "repentance" would be largely meaningless in his eyes).
Do you see my point? The faithful and orthodox Christian (i.e. not the Vox Nova type) would be able to fail in one set of ways (by human weakness), but the relativist would be able to fail in at least two ways (by human weakness, OR by a free choice to change his standards). The Christian has many incentives to act justly (e.g. the grace of God, good upbringing, fear of the consequences of sin--the loss of Heaven, the fires of Hell, the degrading of his life, etc.) in addition to his natural impulses (what the Greeks called "storge"--sentimental, reflexive love), while the relativist has far less reasons; he has his natural abilities, and nothing else. And if you say, "Ah, but the Christian might renounce Christianity", I can only iterate that one who sees a need to retain a moral code is, all other things being equal, more likely to abide by it than is one who sees no need. It's a bit like saying, "I think it more likely to succeed if I at least TRY, first... rather than not trying at all, and hoping I "stumble" into success by sheer accident."
Do you really think that, given one person who is dedicated to an ideal and another person who is not (or who has no ideals), the two are equally likely to succeed at accomplishing a goal in harmony with that ideal? I don't...
Also: to me, it seems rather bizarre to face a person who can say, "I cannot possibly be a hypocrite, since I have no absolute standards to betray." You'd mentioned that the principle of "the ends never justify evil means" smacked of tautology, to you (and I'll try to address that point, later); well... is it not vacuous to say, "I can never betray my standards, since my standards are always shifting to accommodate my whim of the moment"? The word "standards" seems rather superfluous, doesn't it? It doesn't seem to "stand" anywhere!
Robert wrote:
Let's instead start out by not assuming things, eh?
:) Fair enough... mea culpa!
I have no capacity for declaring that I will not intentionally deceive.
In a sense, neither have I (and I suspect that this was the point you've been trying to make, all along); but I *do* have the capacity not to give myself "advance permission" to deceive... and my resolution not to deceive will, I think, affect the likelihood* that I will not deceive, as opposed to being completely apathetic/ambibalent/etc. Fighting for no cause at all never seems to have the conviction and wherewithal of fighting for a cause, in my experience... and I don't think I'm unique in thinking so.
In point of fact, and despite my self-proclaimed devotion to honesty, I do deceive others from time to time. Human as I am, I am known to err in judgment, or otherwise fail to exert my will in my efforts to follow my own moral compass.
I'm trying to wrap my brain around your usage of the word "err", in this sense. You and I can both (I think) grasp the idea of "erring" when doing our sums--that's simply a matter of objective fact (e.g. our attempt at adding 2 + 2 did not yield the provably right answer of "4"); but what does it mean to "err" against a standard which is prone to arbitrary shifting? If I can redefine reality so that "2 + 2 = 5", then my answer of "5" is no longer an error... right? So how can we speak coherently of "erring" if one's standards can easily shift to accommodate the "previously-considered-to-be-wrong" answer?
As for the moral compass: if you have no "true north", of what use is your compass? The very word "compass" would be nothing but a surreptitious plagiarism of an objective idea, for your own amusement! (I do not say that to imply any indignation about such a "theft"--it would be difficult indeed for me to be outraged by compasses of any sort, true or false! :) ) That is: your speech still seems to retain artifacts of language which you've inherited from those who believe in an objective reality (and not simply pretend it might exist, for pragmatic purposes)... which puzzles me.
Here's my ultimate point: if you are determined to be an absolute relativist (and I must say, this has been a fascinating mental exercise!), I don't see how you could at the same time speak of "mistakes", and such... especially since your only attachment to the very idea of "error" may be nothing more than a sentimental one. If you say that your moral compass has thus-and-so sets of standards, then how did you arrive at those standards, as opposed to other ones? And if they're truly arbitrary at a fundamental level, then how can you speak of "standards" at all? One might as well look at a list of unsorted names and declare them to be "organized"--to the extent that they perfectly match the order that they currently have! (I'd consider that rather vacuous, myself...)
A few more bits, before the all-too-objective dwindling amount of free time exhausts itself... :)
(Seriously, I probably won't be able to reply with such fervour and frequency, normally... but I'll enjoy the window of opportunity!)
Robert wrote:
All individuals, possessed of free will, have the capacity to perform any action they wish, whenever they wish it.
Given the correct qualifiers (e.g. any action for which they have the ability, etc.), yes.
Ethical systems, absolute, relative or whatever, have no bearing whatsoever on this fact.
I'd say that they have no "guaranteed and absolute" bearing; they *do* have influence--perhaps extremely strong influence, at that, and probabilities can be greatly altered.
Humans can choose. And choose they will.
Yes... but it's equivocal to imply that "the existence of choices means that all possibilities are equally probable, with no factors giving influence at all". I am free to drive, walk or crawl home (and I live roughly 40 miles from work), but I'm far more likely to do the first, much less likely to do the second, and virtually guaranteed not to do the last... even though all three are "free options" for me. Do you see my point? Influence is not limited to *possibility*; it includes *probability* (in the mathematical sense), as well.
There seems, at least in my eyes, to be a rather stark difference between someone who acknowledges and adheres to a universal moral standard (i.e. the only expected way for him to commit dishonesty would be to "fall" through weakness--and, God willing, to repent of that subsequently and amend his life), and someone who denies both the universal moral standard and any obligation to adhere to it; the latter could commit dishonesty either by "falling" or by giving himself advance permission to do so (with no assurance of repentance--since even the word "repentance" would be largely meaningless in his eyes).
One cannot give one's self permission to break one's own ethical rules. The very concept is nonsensical, as per the agreed upon tautology: evil is evil; immoral is immoral.
Do you see my point? The faithful and orthodox Christian (i.e. not the Vox Nova type) would be able to fail in one set of ways (by human weakness), but the relativist would be able to fail in at least two ways (by human weakness, OR by a free choice to change his standards).
If my standards change to suit my actions, then I have not failed.
Let me elaborate on this point a bit, as I suspect there may be some confusion. Everyone is capable of changing her ethical standard. Everyone does, in fact. This is readily demonstrable, simply by noting that at some point in her past, each person adopts some ethical standard that differs from the previous one -- even if that previous one is as simplistic as a child's.
When a person performs an action contradictory to her ethical standard, she has the choice that you illustrated. She can choose to acknowledge that she has performed an unethical action, and repent in whichever way she chooses. Or she can adjust her ethical standard. "Y'know, I've thought it over," she might mull, "and I really don't feel like I did anything wrong here." Thus, for circumstance X, under condition Y, performing action Z has changed from immoral to moral, in her eyes.
Intellectual honesty precludes me from asserting with any certainty how often this happens in others. But it happens quite often for me. I am constantly studying and refining my ethical standard. Which is not to say that the whole bloody thing is in a constant state of flux, mind you. I prefer to think that my ethics are relatively consistent and reliable. But they can and will change. And I have witnessed ethical standard alterations in others. I may have even inspired a few.
The Christian has many incentives to act justly (e.g. the grace of God, good upbringing, fear of the consequences of sin--the loss of Heaven, the fires of Hell, the degrading of his life, etc.) in addition to his natural impulses (what the Greeks called "storge"--sentimental, reflexive love), while the relativist has far less reasons; he has his natural abilities, and nothing else.
You have no basis in presuming that these are the only two existing motives for forming or adhering to a particular ethical standard. In point of fact, there are other motives. Rationality is one such motive for me. I consider it rational to construct an ethical code such as mine and adhere to it. Inspiration from societal sources can also weigh heavily when forming an ethical standard, particularly from family and friends.
And if you say, "Ah, but the Christian might renounce Christianity", I can only iterate that one who sees a need to retain a moral code is, all other things being equal, more likely to abide by it than is one who sees no need.
Again, you have no basis for that presumption. Each individual's motives for adhering to her ethical standard are her own; and how effective those motives are at encouraging her to stick to it can and will vary greatly.
It's a bit like saying, "I think it more likely to succeed if I at least TRY, first... rather than not trying at all, and hoping I "stumble" into success by sheer accident."
I don't hope to adhere to my ethical standard by accident. I attempt to adhere to it on purpose. As such, I attempt to train my behavior, to guide my actions -- and my refraining from actions -- in accordance with that standard.
Do you really think that, given one person who is dedicated to an ideal and another person who is not (or who has no ideals), the two are equally likely to succeed at accomplishing a goal in harmony with that ideal? I don't...
I couldn't say either way, as I do not know the individuals or the circumstance. In any event, I certainly hope you weren't attempting to imply that individuals such as myself are not dedicated to ideals. I am very much dedicated to several ideals.
This implication seems to be a recurring theme, so I'd like to clarify some more, to really drill this point home. Honesty and integrity are *extremely* important to me. I hold these principles very highly, and strive constantly to adhere to them. Nevertheless, I confess to the possibility that I might very well wake up tomorrow and declare, "Bah, forget all this honesty crap." That could happen. I'm human, and my mind does change.
I do however consider it extraordinarily unlikely. Not simply because I know myself -- I'm not the sort to undergo sudden, violent personality shifts -- but my understanding of human nature would also imply that such an enormous change in a person hardly ever happens overnight, barring unusual circumstances such as drugs, psychosis or brain trauma.
I have no capacity for declaring that I will not intentionally deceive.
In a sense, neither have I (and I suspect that this was the point you've been trying to make, all along); but I *do* have the capacity not to give myself "advance permission" to deceive... and my resolution not to deceive will, I think, affect the likelihood* that I will not deceive, as opposed to being completely apathetic/ambibalent/etc. Fighting for no cause at all never seems to have the conviction and wherewithal of fighting for a cause, in my experience... and I don't think I'm unique in thinking so.
I do fight for causes. The causes are determined by me. And my capacity to be inspired by those causes and to be devoted to those causes is intrinsic to me. Honesty is one such "cause". I wish to be an honest person. Thus, I fight against my impulse to lie when such circumstances arise. Sometimes I succeed, other times I fail. I prefer to think the former outnumbers the latter. Hence, I feel comfortable portraying myself as an honest person. If I didn't, after all, I'd be lying. ;)
I'm trying to wrap my brain around your usage of the word "err", in this sense. You and I can both (I think) grasp the idea of "erring" when doing our sums--that's simply a matter of objective fact (e.g. our attempt at adding 2 + 2 did not yield the provably right answer of "4"); but what does it mean to "err" against a standard which is prone to arbitrary shifting? If I can redefine reality so that "2 + 2 = 5", then my answer of "5" is no longer an error... right? So how can we speak coherently of "erring" if one's standards can easily shift to accommodate the "previously-considered-to-be-wrong" answer?
I don't know what standard (if you'll pardon the term) you're using to determine whether someone's ethical system is "prone" to shifting or not. From my perspective, everyone's ethical standard is capable of shifting, and does in fact shift during their lives.
In any event, that any given person's ethical standard is capable of change does not in turn imply that it has. Hence, if that person performs an action contrary to her standard; and she weighs both the action and the standard and decides to keep her standard; then yes, she has "erred" against her standard and will feel prompted to make amends.
As for the moral compass: if you have no "true north", of what use is your compass? The very word "compass" would be nothing but a surreptitious plagiarism of an objective idea, for your own amusement! (I do not say that to imply any indignation about such a "theft"--it would be difficult indeed for me to be outraged by compasses of any sort, true or false! :) ) That is: your speech still seems to retain artifacts of language which you've inherited from those who believe in an objective reality (and not simply pretend it might exist, for pragmatic purposes)... which puzzles me.
The northward-pointing compass is just an arbitrary a tool as any other. If I were to invent a device that always pointed east, I could just as readily use that to find my way.
Let's explore the compass some more, in fact. Which way is "true north"? The North Pole? Magnetic north? You do know that magnetic north shifts over time, yes? Interesting that you would pick such an arbitrary example as your illustration of the presence of some sort of supposedly universally-accepted standard.
So, no, plagiarizing the use of the term "compass" hardly brushes against any sort of universal concept. Far from it: it presents my point perfectly, that any standard can be applied. Ironically, the more popular compass -- the one that points toward magnetic north -- is the inferior one, as it's a constantly changing standard -- the sort of standard that seems to freak you out a bit. North today ain't north tomorrow!
But just because we don't have a single, universal, rock-solid-concrete standard doesn't mean that compasses are useless. My eastward-pointing compass is a perfectly serviceable tool for preventing myself from becoming lost. It might not function the same way as your northward-pointing one. But it provides the same overall service, and I find it to be sufficiently reliable.
Here's my ultimate point: if you are determined to be an absolute relativist (and I must say, this has been a fascinating mental exercise!), I don't see how you could at the same time speak of "mistakes", and such... especially since your only attachment to the very idea of "error" may be nothing more than a sentimental one.
My concept of "error" is, I dare say, the same as yours: when I discover that I've performed an action contrary to my ethical standard. I could address this situation in two ways: acknowledge it as an error, or adjust my standard to make the action no longer be an error. You have these options as well. That you *choose* not to change your standard doesn't alter the fact that you could.
If you say that your moral compass has thus-and-so sets of standards, then how did you arrive at those standards, as opposed to other ones?
Arbitrarily, of course. Introspection, consideration, reflection, discussion, philosophizing, and lots and lots of cashews. (Mmm, cashews...)
And if they're truly arbitrary at a fundamental level, then how can you speak of "standards" at all? One might as well look at a list of unsorted names and declare them to be "organized"--to the extent that they perfectly match the order that they currently have! (I'd consider that rather vacuous, myself...)
Vacuous it may seem, but it *is* the order. Heck, I do that all the time when I'm handed a database table full of information to which I need to arbitrarily assign IDs. I simply tell the computer to number the first row 1, the next row 2, and so forth. Thus, the data's original order becomes the standard by which the data is sorted.
Now, you might not find that order *useful*. But that's an arbitrary decision on your part. It could turn out that there was a reason that the items were ordered this way. A reason that doesn't matter to you, or even to me, but might be of paramount importance to someone else. And that's an arbitrary consideration on their part.
Humans can choose. And choose they will.
Yes... but it's equivocal to imply that "the existence of choices means that all possibilities are equally probable, with no factors giving influence at all".
I implied no such thing. What factors influence someone's decision-making process, and how strongly those factors influence that decision, is a complex and varying spectrum, varying enormously from person to person, from circumstance to circumstance. Surely at no time would I ever deign to imply that this lack of information should be treated as "all probabilities are equally probable".
I am free to drive, walk or crawl home (and I live roughly 40 miles from work), but I'm far more likely to do the first, much less likely to do the second, and virtually guaranteed not to do the last... even though all three are "free options" for me. Do you see my point? Influence is not limited to *possibility*; it includes *probability* (in the mathematical sense), as well.
Agreed. Furthermore, without any information regarding your circumstance, I could not even begin to assert with any certainty which option you might choose. It seems reasonable to assume that you'll choose the first option, of course. But circumstances might alter your decision. I'm sure I needn't list silly examples (though one involves ketchup!).
Going back to my original point: humans *can* choose to change their ethical standards. How likely any given person is to do so wasn't relevant to my point. I was merely observing that it is possible, at any time, for any person to choose to change her ethical standard. Hence, by definition, they are all arbitrary.
I'm sure I needn't list silly examples (though one involves ketchup!).
(LOL!) Oh, come on, now... you can't possibly leave me in suspense, after THAT sort of teaser...!
(I'll try to write something of substance, later--sheesh, but time is *not* my friend, these past weeks!)
There were days in which some folks were under the unfortunate impression that races of human beings other than caucasian were not people deserving of rights, but rather property to be owned.
That's an interesting exmple. On what basis can you say the impression was unfortunate? For the slave owner, it was quite fortunate, and it would seem, from a relativist ethic, impossible to claim it unfortunate in the sense that some moral approbrium should be heaped upon the slave owner for thinking his slave to be mere property and treating him as such. That was his chosen ethical standard.
I was merely observing that it is possible, at any time, for any person to choose to change her ethical standard. Hence, by definition, they are all arbitrary.
Perhaps there needs to be some clarification an how the term arbitrary is used. It is true that a person can choose to change the ethical system to which they adhere at any time. But that says more about the arbitrary nature of the choice rather than the system itself. I think by an arbitrary ethical system, most would mean an ethical system in which the standards or principles do not change from person to person - in other words, the standards are objective rather than subjective. Thus under the identical ethical conditions X, Y, and Z, person 1 should act as person 2 does in a non-arbitrary ethical system. Simply because person 1 has the capability to act differently does not necessarily make the ethical system arbitrary, it merely makes his choice to follow it or not arbitrary.
That's an interesting exmple. On what basis can you say the impression was unfortunate? For the slave owner, it was quite fortunate, and it would seem, from a relativist ethic, impossible to claim it unfortunate in the sense that some moral approbrium should be heaped upon the slave owner for thinking his slave to be mere property and treating him as such. That was his chosen ethical standard.
My own, of course. I can and will judge the actions of others in comparison to my own ethical standard. If someone else does something that conflicts with my standard, then that person's action is immoral, in my eyes.
I acknowledge, however, that this other person may have an ethical standard different than mine -- quite obviously so, in this case. And consequently, his actions may well be moral in his own eyes. Nevertheless, I felt obliged to interject my own assessment when depicting his actions.
As for the moral compass: if you have no "true north", of what use is your compass?
Ask Capt. Jack Sparrow.
Perhaps there needs to be some clarification an how the term arbitrary is used. It is true that a person can choose to change the ethical system to which they adhere at any time. But that says more about the arbitrary nature of the choice rather than the system itself.
I suppose if you wanted to come from the other direction, and define the set of [All Possible Ethical Systems], and I pick system X and then later change to system Y, then yes, my choice of system was arbitrary even though the standard was already defined. I'm not sure if that stance is meaningful or helpful, but it's a valid one, arguably.
I think by an arbitrary ethical system, most would mean an ethical system in which the standards or principles do not change from person to person - in other words, the standards are objective rather than subjective. Thus under the identical ethical conditions X, Y, and Z, person 1 should act as person 2 does in a non-arbitrary ethical system. Simply because person 1 has the capability to act differently does not necessarily make the ethical system arbitrary, it merely makes his choice to follow it or not arbitrary.
Again, I perceive no meaningful logical distinction between my method (an ethical system only exists if at least one person follows or has followed it) and yours (each ethical system exists within the predefined, abstract set of [All Possible Ethical Systems] and people just pick one). Either way, the actual selection of the system is still arbitrary. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the ethical standard adopted by any given person is still arbitrary. I can still arbitrarily pick a number from one to ten, even though the numbers one through ten are well defined.
I think by a non arbitrary ethical system, most would mean an ethical system in which the standards or principles do not change from person to person - in other words, the standards are objective rather than subjective.
Oops - that is what I meant to write.
I can still arbitrarily pick a number from one to ten, even though the numbers one through ten are well defined.
Yes. I agree with that. This is why I brought up in the other thread the concept of eternal consequences, and why the concept of an objective ethical system is meaningless without the existence of God.
If there is no eternal consequence to choosing any of the sytems 1 through 10, then I would have to agree that there is no particular basis for picking one over any of the others - completely arbitrary.
If there is an eternal consequence to which of the ten systems you choose, then, you can still pick whichever you want and suffer (or enjoy) the consequence. In that sense (you can still choose, consequences be damned) it is still arbitrary.
So, by "absolute" or "objective" ethical system, I simply mean that there are eternal consequences to the system you choose, and one of these defined systems gets you the consequence you may desire. And if you want that consequence, you have to choose that system and no other.
I think we do not disagree much on the arbitrary nature of either the system (for you) or the choice of system (for me). What we do seem to disagree upon is whether any eternal consequences attach to such system or choice, and therefore whether one can define for himself that system on hisown whim. In short, if there is a God, and He doles out the consequences, then we have to use His system. If there is no God, and therefore no eternal consequences, then it doesn't really matter - relativism rules.
So, by "absolute" or "objective" ethical system, I simply mean that there are eternal consequences to the system you choose, and one of these defined systems gets you the consequence you may desire. And if you want that consequence, you have to choose that system and no other.
So noted. I find that terminology confusing and inconsistent, however. That there may or may not be so-called "eternal consequences" to the selection of my ethical system (let alone my adherence to it!) does not in turn speak toward whether that system is an absolute or objective one, as I understand the terms.
Ethics cannot be absolute; I have demonstrated, with what I believe to be incontrovertible, sufficiently conclusive evidence, that they are not absolute, but rather that they are relative. Ethics cannot be objective; again, I believe I have demonstrated, citing evidence, that they are always subjective, and must necessarily be so. Instead, I believe the concept to which you're alluding might be best described as an authoritative system of ethics.
The authoritative system of ethics is simply that system being applied by the power or powers in authority. If we're referring to a government, then the authoritative ethic is the government's, i.e., following the law is right, breaking the law is wrong. If we're referring to a religion, then the authoritative ethic is the pantheon's, i.e., following the religious ethos is right, acting in violation of the ethos is wrong. A tribal society might have a patriarch or matriarch, who similarly sets forth rules, defining an ethic and expecting it to be followed. And so forth. "While you're living under my roof, young lady, you'll do things my way!"
The authoritative ethical system cannot be the only existing system, as we've demonstrated. Nor must it necessarily even be selected as any given individual's personal ethical system; the two need not be the same. And while it may seem sensible for individuals subject to the authority's power to keep the authority's ethic in mind when choosing their actions, they are not constrained, either in actuality (i.e., I can, if I choose, break the law) or in ethicality (I can break the law if I deem it personally ethical to do so, fully aware of the consequences of my actions).
I think we do not disagree much on the arbitrary nature of either the system (for you) or the choice of system (for me). What we do seem to disagree upon is whether any eternal consequences attach to such system or choice, and therefore whether one can define for himself that system on hisown whim. In short, if there is a God, and He doles out the consequences, then we have to use His system. If there is no God, and therefore no eternal consequences, then it doesn't really matter - relativism rules.
I'll again note that the existence of an authoritative ethical system does NOT in turn preclude individuals from choosing their own personal ethical systems and ignoring the authoritative one. Even if there is a "God" (a term we still have yet to define), and even if this being doles out consequences, that does not in turn prevent individuals from acting contrary to the ethics the being sets forth, choosing to face those consequences rather than obey. One can still define one's own ethics on whim, or by any other means, as one sees fit. Free will is sufficient to guarantee this ability.
Robert wrote:
The northward-pointing compass is just an arbitrary a tool as any other. If I were to invent a device that always pointed east, I could just as readily use that to find my way.
:) Try it at the North Pole or South Pole...
But that's partially my point (though I'll admit, it wasn't the best analogy--the phrase "true north" is as much a slogan in Christian circles [as a reference to God as the objective ground of ultimate reality] as it is a geographic reference term; maybe that's why it came so readily to mind). Your supposed "eastward compass" (excepting the geographic poles) are referencing a real and objective (i.e. outside of yourself) direction: the direction in which the Earth rotates on its axis. You didn't make that up out of whole cloth, nor was your compass following some sort of meandering will-o-wisp. The very idea of a compass is to help you find, say, New York City... not to find random coordinates (x,y)... and NYC, random city though it is, does indeed have fixed latitude/longitude coordinates. That's one of the things I mean, when I refer to an "objective" standard. Some odd person might come under the impression that New York City has moved to Bangladesh, but he'd be mistaken... and that fact can be verified rather easily, despite any sentimental/willful attachment to any ideas to the contrary.
Let's explore the compass some more, in fact. Which way is "true north"? The North Pole? Magnetic north?
Well... yes. I *was* aware that it didn't point toward 90' north latitude!
You do know that magnetic north shifts over time, yes?
:) Yes... and that (given the data at hand) it seems to trade places with the southern magnetic pole, periodically. I'm afraid you're showing how lame my analogies can be, when summoned without proper thought...
Interesting that you would pick such an arbitrary example as your illustration of the presence of some sort of supposedly universally-accepted standard.
:P Okay, rub it in...
c matt wrote:
Ask Capt. Jack Sparrow.
(*raspberry*)
So, no, plagiarizing the use of the term "compass" hardly brushes against any sort of universal concept. Far from it: it presents my point perfectly, that any standard can be applied.
Even granting the limited metaphor (substitute geographic north for magnetic, and substitute a GPS for a compass, if you must), I think the main point still stands: north, south, east and west are not meaningless terms. They refer to something stable that's outside of us--even if we'd chosen to call them "Moe, Larry, Curly, and Shem", and mixed/matched them. Let "Shem" = "what used to be called east", and I can still reliably tell from which direction the sun's rays will first strike my house. Let "Moe" = "what used to be north", and I'll still know not to plant my sun-loving plants on the "Moe" side of the house.
But just because we don't have a single, universal, rock-solid-concrete standard doesn't mean that compasses are useless. My eastward-pointing compass is a perfectly serviceable tool for preventing myself from becoming lost. It might not function the same way as your northward-pointing one. But it provides the same overall service, and I find it to be sufficiently reliable.
Exactly. But if reality were as malleable as you say it might be, then how could anyone hope to use such tools reliably? It'd be like living in Wonderland, only worse!
Even if there is a "God" (a term we still have yet to define), and even if this being doles out consequences, that does not in turn prevent individuals from acting contrary to the ethics the being sets forth, choosing to face those consequences rather than obey. One can still define one's own ethics on whim, or by any other means, as one sees fit. Free will is sufficient to guarantee this ability.
I don't recall stating otherwise. But simply because relativism exists, and that we are free to choose to form our own system does not mean that an objective ethical system does not exist. You have proven conclusively that relativism exists. But you have not shown conclusively that an objective system does not or cannot exist, or that all systems must be relative systems.
This discussion cracks me up.
How about the utility of religion. Even hardcore atheists who have an empirical orientation notice the utility of religion as a result of human adaptation. However it is an in-group strategy for social cohesion. We live in a diverse society. Different rules for dealing with out-groups.
Clearly this discussion illustrates why philosophy is not science.
As for abortion, no one with any power, ie. in the gov't gives a crap about morality, relative or not. However a fair percentage passed a few math classes and have figured out that whites with a mean IQ of 100 and a low utilization of abortion have a birthrate of 1.9. Without abortion white TFR could be maybe 2.1, but whites are damned good at using birth control and getting around regulations. Meanwhile blacks (mean IQ about 85, TFR 2.2) and hispanics (mean IQ about 90, TFR 3.0) use abortion at sky high rates. So without abortion, the average non-asian minority birthrate could be as high as 4 kids for every woman. These groups also have notoriously dysfunctional problems like illegitimacy, possibly also a function of low IQ. Since whites pay the vast majority of all federal income taxes which in turn support the underclass, they realize that dumping the morally repugnant practice of abortion would mean they would be overwhelmed in short order, by non-taxpayers with crime rates 3-8 times higher than the white crime rate.
Link to a guy who passed his math classes:
http://lagriffedulion.f2s.com/
Wake up. Morality is an in-group strategy. We are a diverse society and protecting your interests means convincing the simple to behave in self limiting ways. Ever notice how white the Planned Parenthood execs are?
Oh yeah, and how many criminals are moral relativists? LOL
Link to a guy who passed his math classes:
(*sigh*)
Perhaps you hadn't noticed, but the conversation has been admirably civil, up to this point. Would you be so kind as to try to meet that standard, no matter *what* side of the debate you hold?
Perhaps, once you agree to that, we might talk about your--*ahem*--questionable claims.
Truly admirably civil. Unfortunately dancing around the issues as well. You don't find truth by avoiding it.
After you read the claims, I would love to hear a data based discussion.
Is the truth on one side or the other?
Are facts on one side or the other?
When you ignore facts, it isn't a very relevant discussion.
Just a quick note: RL issues will be preventing me from posting for the next few days. I'll be back online as soon as I can be.
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