[guest commentary by Paladin]
I suppose you could say that the fight against relativism (and the liberation of relativists from their error(s)) is one of my life's missions. Illogic bugs me, for one thing... but worse, some of the worst moral decay in our time is due, in large part, to the adoption of moral relativism as our cultural "mental base"... and I really can't help but be concerned about that.
One of the most frustrating things about this battle, however, is the "squirminess" of relativists who are called to defend/argue their case. Here are the top 3 (so far) "defenses" for moral relativism that I've seen on this blog alone--along with the specific name of the fallacy which it represents:
1) "Well, what about *you*? How do *you* find moral certainty?"
fallacy: "Tu Quoque", literally "You, too!", implying that--if you do it too [in their opinion, anyway], it must be right... or at least they can call you a hypocrite, and distract you and others from noticing that the defense of their own position is conspicuously absent; a variant of the "red herring" fallacy.
2) "Everybody knows that [x] is right (or wrong)!"
fallacy: appeal to consensus, implying that something regarded as self-evident must, in fact, be true. (This might be so, but the consensus has nothing whatever to do with that fact, and implies nothing except that the idea is popular and/or pervasive.)
3) "It's practical/expedient to believe [x]! If we didn't, chaos would result!"
fallacy: appeal to consequence. Expediency is expediency, not morality; if an immoral act were more beneficial in some way that was a moral act, the original act would still be immoral; usefulness does not imply moral liceity.
So... let's try this again:
Those who are moral relativists: how do you determine, ULTIMATELY, that any specific act/decision/object is morally good or morally evil? Here are the fallacies and distractions I'd particularly like you to avoid, while answering:
1) Don't tell us that "there's a consensus on the matter"; that's interesting (if true), but completely irrelevant. Examples abound (e.g. Nazi slaughter of the Jews, slavery of African-Americans).
2) Don't try to distract with shouts of "I'm not proving anything until you answer the question yourself!" Not only have we already done so, in many ways... but it's our blog (well... Paul's blog, and I'm a seasonal tenant), and we asked first. Consider it an intellectual and/or soul-searching exercise, to discern your own answer. The unexamined life is not worth living, after all... and it certainly isn't rational; so start examining.
3) Don't say, "It's self-evident!" Lots of things seem self-evident to us, but not to others; it's the hallmark of rationality (and good teaching/writing) to put the "patently obvious" into coherent explanations. Take it from a math teacher; you really don't understand "division" yourself, until you try to teach/explain it to others! Just so, with moral issues: if it's "obviously true", then find the reasons, and articulate them.
As a closing plea: don't try to "play your position against ours" (described above, somewhat) in the vein of "Well, we're both appealing to what's undeniably true--we atheists just use one less unnecessary step [i.e. appeal to God] to do it! You say that God created the universe; we say that the Universe was always there!" For people who pride themselves on supposed rationality, atheists really make me scratch my head with that one; it's as odd as listening to a city kid saying, "Where does milk come from? From the STORE, of course!"--as if that settled the matter completely!
So... relativists: your turn, again. Try to be logical, this time. And be polite. My finger is not often on the "zap" button, but I don't suffer trolls with flame-throwers gladly. Leave the troll suits, incendiary grenades, and the like at home, thank you.
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45 comments:
I'm going to commit "Tu Quoque". In my defense, I'm going to claim that given the human condition(1), neither of us is able to be a moral absolutist beyond a certain extent.
Moral absolutism in meaningless unless:
1. There is an absolute moral code that is objectively true.
2. It is within the ability to human beings to know that this moral code is objectively true.
It is useless to say that the moral code is written on the hearts of men, since that's an appeal to consensus. The hearts of men were fine with slavery for millennia.
Therefore, the only way we can know the objective moral code is if God(2) gives us at least one axiom that we'll know is objectively true. If we know that X is moral, we can deduce that Y, which causes X is moral too and that Z, which prevents X, is not.
Now comes the part where relativism creeps in for me. Since God has not seen fit to grant me a personal revelation(3), I am forced to accept somebody else's claims to a revelation. Unfortunately, there are many competing, mutually exclusive claims. How can I choose?
Unless I can prove that my choice is objectively right, I cannot claim to be a moral absolutist - maybe I just accepted the revelation that was easiest for me to accept. But if St. Thomas Aquinas and Maimonides couldn't prove their choices objectively right(4), what hope do I have?
(1) You would say fallen condition. I believe we're as God planned us to be, since God created Adam, Eve, and the snake, and knew exactly what they would do. But that's a different argument.
(2) God, in this case, defined as the author of the objective moral code. Whether it is logically necessary for that to be the same God who created the world is irrelevant here.
(3) One I'd be able to authenticate. Maybe God speaks to me in my conscience. Or maybe it's just a part of myself, telling me what I want to hear.
(4) They probably believed that they could. But since neither convinced the other, or a bunch of other people way smarter than me who lived since then, I conclude their proofs were faulty in some way.
Ori Pomerantz -
I wish I had more time to respond to your post, but alas I must go to work soon. There is an absolute moral code and it can be known by human beings as objectively true. God has revealed himself to mankind through the holy scriptures. I agree with you that it is useless to say it is written on the hearts of men. The bible teaches us that the natural heart is a heart of stone and that it is wicked. The heart cannot be trusted. Only when the Holy Spirit changes a heart from a heart of stone to a heart of flesh can a human being see rightly the truth in God's word. God's word is foolishness to the natural man. God has not given you the personal revelation that you or other men desire because that particular desire comes from a wicked heart. I'm sorry I don't have time to give you specific bible verses, but if you go to biblegateway.com you can look them up. Jesus said it is a wicked and adulterous generation that seeks after signs and he also said that if men will not believe the prophets that God has sent to teach the truth, those same men will not even believe if a man comes back from the dead.
Nothing surprises God. He is in control of all things. You are correct with point # 1 that God knew man would fall, which is why before the foundation of the world, God had already planned for the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ with His atonement. There really aren't competing claims if one rightly views all the religions of the world. There is one objective truth and the rest are all lies. How can one know this? The difference lies in the difference between monergism and synergism. Synergism teaches falsely that man works with God to bring about his redemption. God and man work together. This is a lie from the pit of hell and every world religion, including many false Christian beliefs, teach this works based righteousness. Man helps earn salvation. The only true religion teaches that God does everything and that man does nothing but is a recipient of grace that he does not deserve. Christ, who was God in the flesh, did everything and atoned for all sin on the cross. Our belief in this truth is also a gift from God. In our natural state, we are dead in our transgressions. Dead men don't choose god. God chooses them. Faith is a gift from God and not a work to be earned.
I wish I could expand further but I must go. Please look into these topics.
Breaking from the Pack, I'm sorry - you've stated an opinion, but you didn't make a convincing argument for it.
if men will not believe the prophets that God has sent to teach the truth, those same men will not even believe if a man comes back from the dead.
That sounds great, until you remember that back when we had prophets we had a host of false ones. See, for example, Jeremiah 14:14.
As for works based righteousness, God gave us a bunch of rules. Why did He do it unless following those rules is good for us?
While I am no Moral Relativist (not being a moralist at all), you have committed a logical fallacy here, yourself: Petitio Principii.
You ask: "how do you determine, ULTIMATELY, that any specific act/decision/object is morally good or morally evil?". That's begging the question -- assuming an ultimate moral good or evil is the opposite of moral relativism and won't be proven by them because they don't believe in it.
Ori wrote:
I'm going to commit "Tu Quoque".
Oh, horrors... not you, too! (Sorry... couldn't resist that one. :) )
In my defense, I'm going to claim that given the human condition(1), neither of us is able to be a moral absolutist beyond a certain extent.
If I understand your point correctly, this may be a case where the difference between intrinsic (a priori) and extrinsic (a posteriori) proofs aren't being kept clearly in mind. It's always *handy* to be able to prove something "mathematically" (i.e. with 100% certainty--with all alternatives shown to be utterly impossible), but only "a priori" proofs can do that--and such proofs are nothing but "if-then" statements which do not describe anything in the physical world "on the ground", as it were.
The discovery/demonstration of an objective set of norms for morality is in the "a posteriori" camp, wherein it's only necessary to prove your case "beyond all REASONABLE doubt". You're right: it's as impossible to prove a set of moral axioms "a priori" (with 100% certainty) as it is to prove beyond all doubt that Julius Caesar actually existed (and wasn't just an elaborate hoax concocted by historians). So long as we prove our case to the point where a denial of that case would entail a violation of sane reason, we're successful. Moral relativists are people who, to at least some extent, will not do even that.
It is useless to say that the moral code is written on the hearts of men, since that's an appeal to consensus. The hearts of men were fine with slavery for millennia.
True. It might be an accurate statement, but it's not designed to prove the case in point.
Therefore, the only way we can know the objective moral code is if God(2) gives us at least one axiom that we'll know is objectively true. If we know that X is moral, we can deduce that Y, which causes X is moral too and that Z, which prevents X, is not.
True, but there are other possibilities. If we can know something of God's nature (even without Divine Revelation), we might be able to deduce something of the objective moral code.
Now comes the part where relativism creeps in for me. Since God has not seen fit to grant me a personal revelation(3), I am forced to accept somebody else's claims to a revelation. Unfortunately, there are many competing, mutually exclusive claims. How can I choose?
You know the answer to that, I think. First, isolate all contradictory claims and make sure you don't embrace them both (or all). Second, examine the claims in the light of sane reason (e.g. is there sufficient evidence? Does the deduction follow from the premises? Etc.). And so on...
Unless I can prove that my choice is objectively right, I cannot claim to be a moral absolutist -
Do remember that you're not "on" to prove it with "mathematical" certainty.
maybe I just accepted the revelation that was easiest for me to accept.
Perhaps... but human reason (if not obstructed) should be sufficient to discern whether that's the case, or not.
But if St. Thomas Aquinas and Maimonides couldn't prove their choices objectively right, what hope do I have? [They probably believed that they could. But since neither convinced the other, or a bunch of other people way smarter than me who lived since then, I conclude their proofs were faulty in some way.]
That's one possible explanation, but not a foregone conclusion, yet. The fact that St. Thomas contradicts Maimonides on point [x] means only that both of them cannot be correct about point [x]; it says nothing in particular about the solidity or quality of their proofs.
Pocket Owl wrote:
While I am no Moral Relativist (not being a moralist at all), you have committed a logical fallacy here, yourself: Petitio Principii. You ask: "how do you determine, ULTIMATELY, that any specific act/decision/object is morally good or morally evil?".
Hm. This may be an issue of semantics (and lack of clarity/specificity in my wording). When I used the word "ultimately", I didn't mean that the given person was responsible for digging to the bottom of reality with 100%, "mathematical" certainty; rather, I was trying to get them to skip a few of the intermediate steps which they usually bring forth, in these types of discussions--to go as far as they COULD. If you like, I was encouraging them to go further than (as an illustration) saying that "milk comes from the supermarket, of course!" (Yes, but there are several more easily identifiable steps before that... and human reason is capable of finding them.)
That's begging the question -- assuming an ultimate moral good or evil is the opposite of moral relativism and won't be proven by them because they don't believe in it.
Not exactly--though, without further qualifiers, I can understand how you'd think so. I'm addressing those who hold to a "core set of moral truths" which they think are "beyond mere opinion" (though some of them shy away from the word "objective"), but who haven't explained the basis for such a code--above and beyond superficial reasons (e.g. "the country adopted it as a law!", "there's a consensus about it!", "it prevents physical and emotional harm!", and other claims which, though probably true, are provably NOT the root of the matter). In other words: there's some history behind my question, and--given the familiarity of the commenters with my previous threads on this topic (see here for the most recent sample), I didn't supply as much background (and as many qualifiers) as I might have done. (I've been accused of being verbose by some of those same commentators, anyway, so I'm trying to restrain myself--and they'll just have to endure any lack of thoroughness, in exchange for my shorter comments! :) )
I think what all this comes down to is a basic assumption on your part.
If we assume, as you do, that the only "correct" or "objective" morality is one dependent upon the commands of some outside source, then of course we have to conclude that the absence of such a source eliminates any good reasons for being moral — but must we make such an assumption?
Since you assume that only a perfectly independent source of moral standards is valid, no argument from human experience will ever succeed. You are, in effect, impervious to any counter-arguments on this issue.
Am I right in saying that you wouldn't accept the basis for my moral system as any superior to the basis of a Nazi moral system because neither basis creates absolute obligations and neither basis is absolute or objective.
Oliver wrote:
I think what all this comes down to is a basic assumption on your part.
Yes, and no; it depends very much on what you mean. See below.
If we assume, as you do, that the only "correct" or "objective" morality is one dependent upon the commands of some outside source,
Half a moment, here: I make no such assumption at all! I certainly don't kow-tow to any alleged source of morality simply because it's an "outside source"! Planned Parenthood is an "outside source", but I'd hardly inform my conscience with input from *them*! For the purposes of this argument, I haven't even assumed that it's "external" at all (though that *is* my ultimate life's conclusion, yes); I ask only that it be stable, reliable, and real (i.e. true).
then of course we have to conclude that the absence of such a source eliminates any good reasons for being moral — but must we make such an assumption?
Absolutely not... and I didn't, and you shouldn't.
Since you assume that only a perfectly independent source of moral standards is valid, no argument from human experience will ever succeed.
Again: yes, and no. As above, I do not insist on an "independent" source, as such... but any source, whether independent or dependent, needs to be able to prove its objective truth (and not be mere opinion, fancy, inherited bias, etc.). That usually does require external standards, yes... though I wasn't assuming that, for this argument.
You are, in effect, impervious to any counter-arguments on this issue.
I don't think so--at least, not as your assumptions stand at the moment. If it helps: remember that I'm trying to find *truth*--absolute truth, and not mere opinion, conjecture, etc. At this point in the argument, I'm open to any and all suggestions which promise anything of the kind.
Am I right in saying that you wouldn't accept the basis for my moral system as any superior to the basis of a Nazi moral system because neither basis creates absolute obligations and neither basis is absolute or objective.
That isn't how I would put it. I would say that your moral system is far superior to the Nazi system, but mostly by accident of birth and inheritance, so to speak. I assert that, to the extent your moral code is good, you've either intuited it from your reasonable awareness of the natural law (which presupposes a foundational order and structure in the non-physical universe, as well as an ultimate cause), or you've inherited it (perhaps unknowingly) from your theistic forebearers (whether in direct blood/family line, or in cultural/country heritage, etc.).
To test that last idea for yourself, ask yourself this: who, in your estimation, was more religious: your parents, or your grandparents? (Carry it back to great-grandparents, or further, if you wish.) Is the trend of our culture toward greater religious devotion, or less? And apart from any claims of goodness/badness of that state of affairs: does it not give credibility to the fact that your moral compass has been unconsciously formed by your forebearers?
Paladin: The discovery/demonstration of an objective set of norms for morality is in the "a posteriori" camp, wherein it's only necessary to prove your case "beyond all REASONABLE doubt".
Ori: Good point, I confused these two. In this case, it's OK for me to hold my moral code the way I used to hold my Atheism - "unless and until I get convinced to the contrary".
Ori Pomerantz-
What is the problem with Jeremiah 14:14? The people obviously did not judge the prophets accordingly by their fruits, as Jesus says, "a good tree cannot bear bad fruit." God certainly did not leave them hanging for he is informing them that they are false prophets and that they will be destroyed and that the people are sinning against God. If you continue the chapter, you will read that the people acknowledge their wicked ways and put their hope in the Lord.
As to your question, "God gave us a bunch of rules. Why did He do it unless following those rules is good for us?" Since this question was answered almost 500 years ago by Martin Luther responding to Erasmus, I will let Martin Luther answer the question:
"And this is the place, where I take occasion to enforce this my general reply:—that man, by the words of the law, is admonished and taught what he ought to do, not what he can do: that is, that he is brought to know his sin, but not to believe that he has any strength in himself. Wherefore, friend Erasmus, as often as you throw in my teeth the Words of the law, so often I throw in yours that of Paul, "By the law is the knowledge of sin,"—not of the power of the will. Heap together, therefore, out of the large Concordances all the imperative words into one chaos, provided that, they be not words of the promise but of the requirement of the law only, and I will immediately declare, that by them is always shewn what men ought to do, not what they can do, or do do. And even common grammarians and every little school-boy in the street knows, that by verbs of the imperative mood, nothing else is signified than that which ought to be done, and that, what is done or can be done, is expressed by verbs of the indicative mood.
Thus, therefore, it comes to pass, that you theologians, are so senseless and so many degrees below even school-boys, that when you have caught hold of one imperative verb you infer an indicative sense, as though what was commanded were immediately and even necessarily done, or possible to be done. But how many slips are there between the cup and the lip! So that, what you command to be done, and is therefore quite possible to be done, is yet never done at all. Such a difference is there, between verbs imperative and verbs indicative, even in the most common and easy things. Whereas you, in these things which are as far above those, as the heavens are above the earth, so quickly make indicatives out of imperatives, that the moment you hear the voice of him commanding, saying, "do," "keep," "choose," you will have, that it is immediately kept, done, chosen, or fulfilled, or, that our powers are able so to do."
paladin said...
I'm addressing those who hold to a "core set of moral truths" which they think are "beyond mere opinion"
Then you are not addressing Moral Relativists. Perhaps you just disagree as to the nature or correct source of this "core set of moral truths"?
Pocket Owl wrote, in reply to my comment:
[Paladin]
I'm addressing those who hold to a "core set of moral truths" which they think are "beyond mere opinion"
[Pocket Owl]
Then you are not addressing Moral Relativists. Perhaps you just disagree as to the nature or correct source of this "core set of moral truths"?
I do, but there's more than that, here. Consider the following examples:
1) someone who holds murder to be a moral evil because he examined it in the light of sane reason, and finds it to be a violation of the objective (natural) moral law
2) someone who holds murder to be a moral evil because he unthinkingly inherited an emotional prejudice against it--from biological and societal forebearers
3) someone who holds murder to be a moral evil in most circumstances (i.e. the ones which don't meet with his personal tastes--think of someone who wouldn't mind having a hated enemy murdered, for example)
Of the three (and there are many other possibilities), I'd say that only the first could escape the charge of "moral relativism"... but that the third is further along the relativistic spectrum than is the second.
Perhaps this would help: we're facing a society which once viewed slavery with toleration, and now (for the most part) abhors it; the same society once abhorred homosexual acts as perversions, but those acts are now widely tolerated (and even "celebrated"); the same society once condenmed abortion as murder most foul, but it now defends it as a "civil right"; this culture even condemned artificial contraception as perverse, but it now trumpets AC as a boon and blessing. Can you see how these changes must indicate a moral standard which changes over time? (Some of these are good--like the abolition of slavery; while others are evil, like the other examples above... and one of my questions to these people is, "How do you know that [x] has changed for the better/worse?" By what standards do you judge "better" and "worse"?) On this (and similar) threads, I've asked those who tolerated (and/or approved of) abortion, AC, homosexual acts, etc., for their reasons for doing so... and I've encountered moral relativism at its finest. That's part of my purpose, here: to get these people to "dig" for deeper reasons for their convictions, and to think these things through.
What you are you suggesting is more commonly called the 'Divine Command theory'.
The most important implication of this theory is that immoral actions are wrong solely because God forbids them (and similarly that the ‘rightness’ of moral actions is only that God has commanded them).
God could have just as easily forbidden love and commanded that we torture babies. If his command is all that decides morality, then this is unacceptably arbitrary.
Oliver: God could have just as easily forbidden love and commanded that we torture babies. If his command is all that decides morality, then this is unacceptably arbitrary.
Ori: You forgot who you're arguing with. Muslims believe that God is inscrutable, beyond human reason. Catholics, IIRC, believe that God's logic is often understandable to human beings.
God could have just as easily forbidden love and commanded that we torture babies. If his command is all that decides morality, then this is unacceptably arbitrary.
Not at all. God's moral commands are much more like the owner's manual that comes with your car.
You wouldn't claim that your car's owner's manual is "arbitrary," in that it might just as easily mandate driving into walls at high speeds as standard maintenance, instead of regular oil changes.
God's moral commands are not arbitrary, they are what is best for us.
Ori and Paul addressed the gist of this already, but... Oliver wrote:
What you are you suggesting is more commonly called the 'Divine Command theory'. The most important implication of this theory is that immoral actions are wrong solely because God forbids them (and similarly that the ‘rightness’ of moral actions is only that God has commanded them). God could have just as easily forbidden love and commanded that we torture babies. If his command is all that decides morality, then this is unacceptably arbitrary.
I'm afraid this is a case of mistaken identity; I do not subscribe to such a capricious idea in the least. It is as impossible for God to will (i.e. directly choose) an evil as it would be for God to create a square circle: the very idea is self-contradictory.
Do remember the correct definition of evil: the privation (i.e. total lack) of a good that should, by nature, be present. God is self-existent with the fullness of being, and He is infinitely good (i.e. with no evil--no privations of necessary goods--within Him). As such, His Perfect Will (i.e. by which He enacts things) is incompatible with evil of any sort.
And in case you ask about the old seeming-paradox: "Is [x] good solely because God wills it, or does God will it solely because it's good? The first makes God's "goodness" arbitrary, and the second subordinates God to some sort of "external good", which doesn't make sense in an omnipotent and omnipresent God!" Neither option is correct. Rather, God's very nature (i.e. "what" He is) is the fullness of being (i.e. excluding all evil), and both the "goodness" and God's "Willing" of the good flow from that nature.
Think of "A = God's Perfect Nature", "B = God's Perfect Will", and "C = Goodness". The "paradox" above presents a false dilemma: it asks if B flows from C, or if C flows from B. Neither is true; both B and C flow from A.
Of course, if you *weren't* going to ask, then... well... never mind! :)
You are effectively saying “God does as God commands”, a logical triviality. If he were different, he would still be just as praiseworthy to you. For such praise to have any meaning, there must be an independent standard of “goodness” (morality) against which we can favourably compare God. To compare him to himself will achieve nothing.
Paul said:
God's moral commands are not arbitrary, they are what is best for us."
So, God observed us, and judged what was best for us. By what standard did he make that decision?
Are you not just arguing the 'ideal observer theory'?
Oliver,
I think you missed and/or misunderstood my "paradox" comment, above; it addresses your comment directly.
More later... must dash!
Do you mean this?
"Rather, God's very nature (i.e. "what" He is) is the fullness of being (i.e. excluding all evil), and both the "goodness" and God's "Willing" of the good flow from that nature."
Not sure that makes much sense.
So, God observed us, and judged what was best for us. By what standard did he make that decision?
No, God, having made us, knows better than we do what is best for us, and he knows better than we do what our purpose is.
So only God can really know what is right and wrong.
Either way, you are saying that:
1)things are good/bad because god says so
or,
2)God has insight that we don't and that enables him to make the best judgements about what is good or not.
But this implies some moral standard outside of God.
Oliver-
It is number 1. Things are good and bad because God says so.
You said, "For such praise to have any meaning, there must be an independent standard of “goodness” (morality) against which we can favourably compare God."
There cannot be an independent standard of "goodness" to measure God against because that would assume that there is something greater or higher than God. If that were true, God is not really God at all.
God's standards may appear arbitrary to you, but that is because you are finite, fallen, and fallible. So am I. We often forget that for God to be God, he must have no beginning, he must be all powerful, all wise, all knowing, ever present, incapable of evil, incapable of being thwarted by anything or anyone. If God is not all these things, He is really no god at all.
Even believers get into the problem of not seeing themselves correctly in relation to the Almighty. We are like little children. When you were two years old and your parents gave you a directive, that may have included corporal punishment, you may have thought there rules arbitrary and their punishment cruel. However, you were too ignorant to understand all their motives and reasons. As you have grown older, you understand now that what appeared arbitrary and cruel in the past was actually an attempt to protect you from harm. It is this way with the Lord, however the comparison breaks down because there are human parents who are cruel and sometimes they are selfish and don't always do what is the best interests of their children. God is always just and always does what is right. This comparison also breaks down because now that you are older, you understand your parents better. You may even comprehend them completely. Yet we are still like little children before God. I can study God my whole life and my understanding of the depths of God will never get farther than a drop in a bucket. We are too limited to understand Him as well as we would like. This is why God's character is so important. Since we cannot know or understand everything about God, if we know God's character, we can trust Him with what we do not understand.
No amount of logic can change your heart toward God. Logic is a human creation and it is fallible. Only the Holy Spirit can move your heart to see the truth. Paladin, Paul, and I cannot convince you about the truths of God. We can be nothing more than seed scatterers.
Oliver wrote, in reply to Paul:
So, God observed us, and judged what was best for us.
Not so; God didn't have to "wait and see what we were like" before knowing what was best for us (and the idea of an eternal God "waiting" for anything makes no sense, anyway); He knew it from all eternity. Even if God were a "temporal" (i.e. withing time) Creator, He wouldn't need to deduce "what was best for us" by *observation*, any more than the designer of a car would need to examine a model of his car before he could build one properly (which is also absurd--design precedes construction, for us temporal creatures).
By what standard did he make that decision?
The very word "decision" implies a process through time, which wouldn't apply to God, in this specific case; one can't "decide" or "discover" something which has been known all along, from eternity.
Are you not just arguing the 'ideal observer theory'?
Given that God cannot be called an "observer" in that sense, I don't see how.
Oliver wrote, in reply to my comment:
You are effectively saying “God does as God commands”, a logical triviality.
No. Words mean things, even when talking about absolutes; the idea that "God enjoys the fullness of being" (which is logically equivalent to saying, "God is all-good") has meaning, just as the idea of a glass being "completely full" has meaning, even without a ruler, measuring cup, etc., nearby. Think about that: how do *you* tell when a glass (or whatever) isn't completely full? Do you need another (separate) object with which to compare it? Or can you compare it with "itself", in the sense of comparing it to the "perfection" which it could obviously have, by its nature?
If he were different, he would still be just as praiseworthy to you.
You've missed the point: I'm asserting that it's logically impossible for God to be different than Who He Is. Your statement, as it stands, has no logical meaning; it's like saying, "If that triangle were four-sided, its interior angles wouldn't add up to 180 degrees, after all!"... which abstracts from the fact that four-sided figures are not triangles at all.
For such praise to have any meaning, there must be an independent standard of “goodness” (morality) against which we can favourably compare God.
If I understand you correctly (and I'm not at all sure I am), you're running into the main problem with talking about an infinite God: our human language is broken into discrete "bits", and we can only talk about finite things with them, and even those "discrete words don't necessarily have any one-to-one connection with a real, existing object. (That's why we can construct nonsense phrases like "square circle" and "married bachelor".) The best we can do with words, for the most part, is to say what God is *not*.
In your example, you're considering how we *talk about* God (e.g. praise, etc.), which will be rife with difficulties. But rest assured: God's goodness is intrinsic to His Nature; He didn't just "decide" to be good (among other possible options); God could no more choose evil than He could destroy Himself.
To compare him to himself will achieve nothing.
I'm afraid that's one of the only meaningful ways that we *can* talk about God, given our limited language and thoughts! We, using abstractions, can speak (with some coherence) of comparing God as He Is with God as He is not (i.e. limited, flawed, evil, a creature, etc.), just as we compare the completely full glass to "itself", but not as it currently is. (Granted, the glass is a limited metaphor, since it's logically possible for the glass to be less than full--a condition impossible for God.)
Oliver wrote:
So only God can really know what is right and wrong.
That's not true, as stated. God's Nature is all-good, and we can know *something* of good and evil (though not everything--especially on this side of the veil). To suggest that we can never "really know what is right and wrong" is agnosticism, and it's quite wrong. We can know a great deal about what's right and wrong (and identify specific cases clearly) without understanding good and evil at its "deepest depths" (which is impossible for us, anyway). Let's not fall into the error of univocation: it *is* possible to know *enough* about a topic to put it to good use, just as it's possible to drive a car without knowing everything about internal combustion engines, physics, computer science, and the like.
Either way, you are saying that:
1)things are good/bad because god says so
No... and I addressed that earlier. God is Good by nature; it is impossible for Him to be other than Who He Is... and that means something, just as a "completely full glass" means something.
or, 2)God has insight that we don't and that enables him to make the best judgements about what is good or not. But this implies some moral standard outside of God.
You're still making the error of talking about God as if He were a limited observer within time--and that is not so. God doesn't need to "wait" to see what happens, and He doesn't need to "examine" anything in order to know/understand something. All talk of God "examining/looking" are metaphors... and very limited ones, at that.
Breaking from the pack: What is the problem with Jeremiah 14:14? The people obviously did not judge the prophets accordingly by their fruits, as Jesus says, "a good tree cannot bear bad fruit."
Ori: When Jeremiah said this the fruits weren't in yet - so people didn't know which prophets were true and which weren't. They didn't have the hindsight we do.
I'll need to think how to answer your Martin Luther comment - it may be too difficult to communicate why I find it ghastly. I'm Jewish, so some of my basic assumptions are different from yours.
Breaking from the Pack,
Some excellent (and inspirational) points, in your comment! I'd just offer one or two corrections on details:
You wrote, in reply to Oliver:
It is number 1. Things are good and bad because God says so.
That's partially true, but in a limited sense that needs a few qualifiers. Things aren't good and bad ONLY because "God says so", in the sense that God could mandate the torture of innocents tomorrow and still have it be "good be definition". We theists are rightly protective of God's dignity, and we can sometimes be led into errors while trying to "over-correct" from the even more outrageous errors of atheists/agnostics; and this may be one of those times, when we get scared of saying that "God is limited" in any way.
This is a bit involved, but let me try to explain:
You've probably heard the old canard, "If God's all-powerful, then can He create a stone so heavy that not even He can lift it?" (There are dozens of variations: creating square circles, creating married bachelors, etc.) This can be an alarming question to theists, at first, because an answer of "yes" seems to imply that God's limited in His "lifting" ability, and an answer of "no" seems to imply that God's limited in His "creating" ability... and we don't want to admit that God's limited in any way (and rightly so). But all of this stems from the fact that we humans use a limited, piecemeal language, with words and images which abstract from reality.
Let me go a step further, and use a case that often not even the atheists think to use--I'll give an example of something that *I* can do that God *cannot* do! (That's even better than the "square circle" challenge, since no human can do that, either!) Here it is:
Can God sin?
The answer, of course, is "no"... and anyone with practical knowledge of me knows, full well, that I can certainly sin. Thus, I can do something that God cannot do. Sounds alarming, doesn't it? Never fear: there's a reason behind it all... and I'll highlight it with my favourite counter-question to these sorts of things:
Can God bleeble-de-squirg?
Well? Can He, or can't He? He's supposed to be omnipotent, right?
The problem is not in God's power; the problem is in that I've spoken absolute nonsense. ("Bleeble-de-squirg" is a meaningless string of syllables which I put together for this example.) Translated, I really asked this: "Can God _____?" It's hardly a limitation on God to say that God cannot do [x], and [x] is nothing (i.e. the empty set)! Whenever God "fails" to enact a logical contradiction (i.e. true nothingness), God hasn't failed at anything!
So how about the "posers", above?
"God cannot sin." (Since sin is a violation of the Will of God, God cannot will to break His Own Will. [There are other problems, but this is one of the most obvious.]
"God cannot create a square circle." (God cannot ___.)
...and so on.
One last note. You wrote:
Paladin, Paul, and I cannot convince you about the truths of God. We can be nothing more than seed scatterers.
Certainly, we can (and must) scatter good seed... but we can also remove the intellectual "stumbling stones" which stand in the way of an otherwise free choice to accept or reject the Truth. That's the true purpose of logical argument, in fact.
Paladin said::
"God's Nature is all-good"
You argue, for example, that God would never condone killing, raping, stealing, and torturing, for God is all-good. But to make such a claim is to render your theory vacuous. As such, you tell us what makes something good by offering a definition of morality. But if goodness is a defining attribute of God, then God cannot be used to define goodness, for, in that case, the definition would be circular - the concept being defined would be doing the defining - and such a definition would be uninformative.
If being all-good is an essential property of God, then all you are telling us is that good actions would be willed by a supremely good being. While this is certainly true, it is unenlightening. For it does not tell us what makes something good and hence does not increase our understanding of the nature of morality.
It is unreasonable to believe that an action is right because God wills it to be done. One can plausibly believe that God wills an action to be done because it is right, but to believe this is to believe that the rightness of an action is independent of God. In any event, the view that the moral law requires a divine lawgiver is untenable.
Oliver wrote:
You argue, for example, that God would never condone killing, raping, stealing, and torturing, for God is all-good.
If you change the first of your examples to "murder", I would agree. There are some situations (e.g. self-defense, capital punishment, etc.) where God might condone killing, given a grave enough reason (and given that the evil of death is a secondary effect--not the intention).
But to make such a claim is to render your theory vacuous. As such, you tell us what makes something good by offering a definition of morality.
No... I gave you an example, not a definition, when I cited moral situations. The *definition* of goodness is "the fullness of being", lacking no good which is proper to it by nature.
But if goodness is a defining attribute of God,
Depending on how you mean "defining attribute", that's so.
then God cannot be used to define goodness, for, in that case, the definition would be circular - the concept being defined would be doing the defining - and such a definition would be uninformative.
Let's try again, then:
Goodness, as such, is that which lacks nothing proper to its nature. Evil, as such, is the lack of a good which is proper to an object's nature. As such, "goodness" can exist in and of itself, but evil cannot--since evil, by definition, requires an object which is deprived of a "natural" good.
If being all-good is an essential property of God, then all you are telling us is that good actions would be willed by a supremely good being. While this is certainly true, it is unenlightening. For it does not tell us what makes something good and hence does not increase our understanding of the nature of morality.
:) You didn't read through my proof for the existence of God, did you?
(*sigh*) Very well; I was hoping not to have to be "verbose" about it in this thread, but there seems to be no helping it. I'll try to write a bit about it in my next comment (and try not to run afoul of the 4096-character "Paladin Limit"). But for now, suffice it to say that "goodness" has recognizable and coherent properties which can be known by human reason, and without recourse to a false "cause and effect" idea which would say that "[x] is good BECAUSE God willed it" or "God willed [x] BECAUSE it was good; both are incorrect and misleading (and you've gravitated toward the latter error, I think).
It is unreasonable to believe that an action is right because God wills it to be done.
If you mean a strict cause/effect link, yes; if you mean something more rhetorical, such as "We can know that [x] is good, because God willed it," that would not be unreasonable.
One can plausibly believe that God wills an action to be done because it is right, but to believe this is to believe that the rightness of an action is independent of God.
One cannot maintain that, either. If God is the Uncaused Cause Who is the Infinite Ground of all being, self-sufficient and self-existent (and such an Uncaused Cause can be shown to exist by necessity), then there cannot be anything (including your hypothetical "external standard") which could exist "apart from God". The cause/effect statement is false in the other direction, as well. Look again at my "A,B,C" example, above.
In any event, the view that the moral law requires a divine lawgiver is untenable.
That may be your opinion--but nothing you've presented here leads to that conclusion.
If I undersand Oliver's question/objection at all, it seems to involve this:
"In all this talk about [x] being good because God willed it, or that God willed [x] because it was good, or that God's will of [x] and the goodness of [x] flow from the Divine Nature of God, which is Goodness itself: what, exactly, IS goodness? We've talked about it and about its origins, but what is it? What does it look like, and how can we use it to identify the good from the evil?"
The problem is not that there are so few ways to go about this, but that there are so many! Here's only one of them:
A. A supremely perfect God exists.
Summary (and this leaves out *scores* of details! Ask about them individually, if you must...):
1) No object can be its own cause.
2) Causation implies change, and vice versa.
3) Any uncaused object is necessarily eternal.
4) Any uncaused cause is equivalent to existence per se.
5) Any uncaused cause must be unlimited and unique.
6) Our universe contains examples of changeable, non-eternal objects.
7) Ergo, an uncaused cause is required, as per #3-5.
B. Theism, by its recognition of this necessity (described in (A)), is the most reasonable paradigm by which the world and its dynamics can be explained. Since the "uncaused cause" conclusion is in harmony with theism, and not with atheism (which denies the uncaused cause) and agnosticism (which denies the knowability of the uncaused cause), it is reasonable to adopt a theistic paradigm until more compelling evidence/reasoning suggests otherwise.
C. Christianity is the most self-consistent paradigm which is also in harmony with theism and with the facts available to us in the natural world; thus, it is reasonable to assume Christianity as our paradigm until more compelling evidence/reasoning suggests otherwise.
D. Catholicism is the most self-consistent paradigm which is also in harmony with Christianity and with the facts available to us both in the natural world and within the contents of Divine Revelation (see (E), below); thus, it is reasonable to assume Catholicism as our paradigm until more compelling evidence/reasoning suggests otherwise.
E. Catholicism has confirmed that various facts have been communicated by God to us (i.e. Divine Revelation, or "The Sacred Deposit of Faith")--among which are guidelines for discerning the good from the evil.
F. Catholicism has confirmed that our human nature, though wounded by Original Sin, is still capable of recognizing truth (a.k.a. "the good") through the use of human reason, and of "tasting" truth through the use of human instincts and emotions--though these faculties (especially the latter) are clouded and fallible. Thus, it is possible (to a limited extent) to have an awareness of that which is good (or evil), even without explicit help from Divine Revelation.
G. Given all of the above, the most reliable way to discern the good from the evil is through examination of (and implementation of guiding principles given by) the Divine Revelation entrusted to man through Christ's Church; personal "awareness" might well be useful, but the fallen nature of man has rendered it weakened and less than strongly reliable.
I'm well aware of the fact that this schema leaves "grey areas" of morality; but given our fallen human condition, there's little hope of reprieve from that, this side of eternity. But you did ask.
So... go to it. Tear it apart at your leisure. :) My feelings won't be hurt by thorough examination (or even complete demolition) of my presented schema; just be logical about it, and do be polite, please. Life is too short to debate those who insist on being irritable and obnoxious.
"A. A supremely perfect God exists.
Summary (and this leaves out *scores* of details! Ask about them individually, if you must...):
1) No object can be its own cause.
2) Causation implies change, and vice versa.
3) Any uncaused object is necessarily eternal.
4) Any uncaused cause is equivalent to existence per se.
5) Any uncaused cause must be unlimited and unique.
6) Our universe contains examples of changeable, non-eternal objects.
7) Ergo, an uncaused cause is required, as per #3-5."
"Summary (and this leaves out *scores* of details!"
Yeah, ya think?
Please explain how you get to "A. A supremely perfect God exists" from "Ergo, an uncaused cause is required, as per #3-5."
Sorry, I can't find my troll suit. Guess I'll just have to go naked.
John wrote, in reply to my comment:
[Paladin]
"Summary (and this leaves out *scores* of details!"
[John]
Yeah, ya think?
Yessireebob, ah reckon ah do!
(*wry look*) Honestly, John... no offense taken, but are you at all capable of conversing without recourse to scoffing, sarcasm, and "acerbic wit"? Try it, sometime... civility and graciousness are useful skills to have.
Please explain how you get to "A. A supremely perfect God exists" from "Ergo, an uncaused cause is required, as per #3-5."
Try reading here for background and details on that idea. Summary: that which is self-existent, unique, eternal (i.e. beyond space and time), enjoys the fullness of existence, is identical with existence itself, and is unlimited in every substantial way would, in fact, be supremely perfect. You'll have to explain why, apart from personal taste, you don't think so.
Sorry, I can't find my troll suit.
That, friend, is a matter of opinion. :)
Guess I'll just have to go naked.
Well... if one were hypothetically a troll to the core, that wouldn't preclude having a "troll suit"; but I do hope that's not the case.
I just don't see the necessity from A to B.
Why can't the theory of a continuous series of contracting and expanding universes be any less plausible to satisfy A?
That could be the uncaused cause. Or that could have been created by another uncaused cause. There is nothing in A that requires an aware being as the uncaused cause.
You have argued that morality is dependent upon God, and that moral obligation consists in obedience to God’s commands. You claim that morality is ultimately based on the commands or character of God, and that the morally right action is the one that God commands or requires.
We then arrived at what is known as 'The Euthyphro Dilemma', where, you were forced to choose a god with an arbitrary morality or a god who chooses what is right because it is right.
I think your response to the dilemma at this point was something like...
If we conceive of the good life for human beings as consisting in activities and character qualities that fulfill us, then the good life will depend upon our nature, as human beings. Given human nature, some activities and character traits will fulfill us, and some will not.
God created us with a certain nature. Once he has done this, he cannot arbitrarily decide what is good or bad for us, what will help or hinder us from functioning properly.
To which I would reply, why did God create us with the nature that we possess, rather than some other nature. What grounded this decision?
Which leads to my next point. In your comments, you stated:
'Catholicism has confirmed that our human nature... is still capable of recognizing truth (a.k.a. "the good") through the use of human reason, and of "tasting" truth through the use of human instincts and emotions-'
You are saying that man does not need god to know right from wrong. Correct?
In your summary A-G you described how you arrived at the conclusion that the dogma of the Catholic Church 'best fits' the evidence. Maybe you used the 'capability to recognise truth', which you were talking about earlier, to make this decision.
It seems to me that on one hand you are arguing that without god all moral ideas are just whim and fancy, and yet on the other hand, you say the exact opposite AND provide evidence from personal experience to the contrary.
Stephanie wrote:
I just don't see the necessity from A to B. Why can't the theory of a continuous series of contracting and expanding universes be any less plausible to satisfy A? That could be the uncaused cause.
That which exhibits change cannot be an uncaused cause; see here.
Or that could have been created by another uncaused cause.
If "it" had been created, then it wasn't an *uncaused* cause, and there'd be no point in speaking of "another" uncaused cause; the first "caused" cause would be disqualified. But it's impossible to have an infinite regression of "causes", at any rate. Ibid.
There is nothing in A that requires an aware being as the uncaused cause.
That's possible, though arguable (and perhaps I'll argue that point a bit later--that'll take some heavy thought). One of my key points, however, was this: given a necessity for an unlimited, eternal, self- and fully-existent uncaused cause, which is more inconformity with that idea: atheism, or theism? I'd say the latter.
I still don't see why a continuous series of contracting and expanding universes could not be infinite. It gains and loses no energy.
For my second point, I think you misunderstood. I was postulating that if this series of universes was not infinite, then it's cause could be infinite. And that cause is not necessarily an aware being as well.
I agree the last is point for argument. But you haven't convinced me that the agnostic doesn't have the better reason here since it is arguable the nature of the uncaused cause.
Oliver wrote:
You have argued that morality is dependent upon God, and that moral obligation consists in obedience to God’s commands.
In a sense, yes... so long as you don't mean to say, "[x] is moral only because God, for whatever reason (or for no reason), says so!" That would be false.
You claim that morality is ultimately based on the commands or character of God,
Back up. The commands of God and the character of God are two distinct things; and I never mentioned the "character", but rather the "Nature" of God.
and that the morally right action is the one that God commands or requires.
Not exactly. If God commands or requires [x], then [x] is certainly morally right... but that's not the same as saying that "[x] is right solely because God commanded/required it."
We then arrived at what is known as 'The Euthyphro Dilemma', where, you were forced to choose a god with an arbitrary morality or a god who chooses what is right because it is right.
What you call the "Euthyphro Dilemma" is precisely what I refuted, when saying that "B and C both flow from A", where "A = God's Nature", "B = God's Will", and "C = the goodness of the object/action itself". Euthyphro claimed that God's commands were "good by definition, since God made them" (i.e. "C flows from B"); Socrates claimed that "The God" was limited to only those commands which were aready "good" by some external standard (i.e. "B flows from C"); but the Church claims that neither Euthyphro nor Socrates were correct... but that the Nature of God is the efficient cause both of the goodness of action [x] and God's Will toward [x].
I think your response to the dilemma at this point was something like: "If we conceive of the good life for human beings as consisting in activities and character qualities that fulfill us,
I did not say that... partially because there's a relentless human tendency to be sloppy when defining the word "fulfill"; most people err in thinking of "fulfillment" as some sort of emotional gratification, which is hardly the true and full meaning of the word.
then the good life will depend upon our nature, as human beings.
Yes, and no. "The good" is dependent upon the all-perfect Nature of god, not on our nature. But given that, it's possible to say, "[x] is good for man but not for fish, due to the specific nature of man" (say, [x] = "breathing air", for example), yes. Just don't mistakenly generalize that to say, "all human good is dependent upon human nature" as if human nature were somehow able to contain its own reason for being (which is nonsense).
Given human nature, some activities and character traits will fulfill us, and some will not.
True... so long as you remember that "fulfill" does not refer to mere satisfaction of emotions, passions, bodily appetites, and the like.
To be continued...
Oliver wrote, paraphrasing my earlier point:
God created us with a certain nature. Once he has done this, he cannot arbitrarily decide what is good or bad for us, what will help or hinder us from functioning properly.
He cannot choose it arbitrarily, that is true... since nothing God does is arbitrary. The fact that God chooses something freely does not logically imply that the choice was a mere whim, fancy, or other arbitrary act.
To which I would reply, why did God create us with the nature that we possess, rather than some other nature. What grounded this decision?
To much of that question, I'll have to say, "I have no idea... nor should anyone expect me to know all of the details of such questions." Why should God have given us lungs rather than gills? I've no idea. Why do we have ten fingers (counting thumbs), rather that eight? Again... I don't know. The probable reasons for *some* aspects of human nature can be deduced with reasonable assurance... and those bits which are essential for our eternal salvation are certainly able to be clarified (either by natural reason or by Divine Revelation), but no one (least of all, I) presumed to say that all aspects of human nature could be mapped out neatly and completely, like a telephone directory. One might as well say that one can predict the ultimate and exact shape of a fractal, given its algorithm (which is not at all true)...
Which leads to my next point. In your comments, you stated: "Catholicism has confirmed that our human nature... is still capable of recognizing truth (a.k.a. "the good") through the use of human reason, and of "tasting" truth through the use of human instincts and emotions-"
You are saying that man does not need god to know right from wrong. Correct?
Not correct. Man does not need explicit Divine Revelation in order to know the rudiments of morality, since it is "hard-wired" into our nature by God--the same Source as gives us Divine Revelation. But to say that man "does not need God to know right from wrong" is dreadfully far from the facts; how would we have our "moral compass" (i.e. "hard-wired" intuition for discerning/deducing good/evil), if God bad not placed it there? It'd be like saying that we don't need sheep for mutton, since the butcher supplies it for us instead!
In your summary A-G you described how you arrived at the conclusion that the dogma of the Catholic Church 'best fits' the evidence. Maybe you used the 'capability to recognise truth', which you were talking about earlier, to make this decision.
I do.
It seems to me that on one hand you are arguing that without god all moral ideas are just whim and fancy, and yet on the other hand, you say the exact opposite AND provide evidence from personal experience to the contrary.
I don't see how you could maintain anything of the sort. Remember what I said earlier, about "intrinsic" vs. "extrinsic" proofs? Extrinsic proofs (such as proving that there are no penguins in the room) are data-dependent, are they not? But it'd be an error to dismiss such proofs on the idea that "personal experience" (i.e. sense data, and analysis/synthesis of them) was needed (as if the data were "merely anecdotal").
Stephanie wrote:
I still don't see why a continuous series of contracting and expanding universes could not be infinite. It gains and loses no energy.
The "gain and loss of energy" is not to the point; the fact that it changes, at all, is the problem. That which changes is limited, by definition, since change is (by definition) a change from potentiality to actuality, or from actuality to potentiality. Consider a rock dropped from my hand; the instant it's dropped, it loses its state of being at relative rest (and loses some heat which had been coming from my hand, etc.), and it loses its position at coordinates (x,y,z); then it gains relative velocity, and (in continuous* sequence) it gains all of the intermediate positions/coordinates between its original location and the ground. No change can take place without these "gains and losses"; and that which "gains" anything proves itself to be limited, thereby. Since one of the requirements for the "uncaused cause" is a complete lack of limitation (and therefore a complete lack of change), "infinite cycles of expanding/contracting universes" would not do. Even if such a sequence were to happen (and there's no reason why it couldn't, so far as I can tell), the "infinite chain" would itself ultimately require an uncaused cause.
(*) There's some debate about the continuity of space/time, but it's not germane to this point.
For my second point, I think you misunderstood. I was postulating that if this series of universes was not infinite, then it's cause could be infinite. And that cause is not necessarily an aware being as well.
For the time being, I grant the possibility: there is no immediately apparent way that the "uncaused cause" argument necessitates a self-aware, "personal" (i.e. having intellect, will and memory) God (though again, I may take up that argument later; remind me if I forget for too long!).
I agree the last is point for argument. But you haven't convinced me that the agnostic doesn't have the better reason here since it is arguable the nature of the uncaused cause.
Agnostics, in my experience, usually do a "bait-and-switch" argument: by which they admit the possibility (or even the necessity) of an uncaused cause, then argue that such a cause might not be "personal", and then go back to "functional atheism" (i.e. reverting back to an "I'm not convinced that there's a God at all"). It's been rather a waste of time, trying to debate people like that. If you're willing to admit the certain existence of an uncaused cause (without back-pedalling), then we can pursue a new branch of this argument down that path. Are you?
So we have two arguments going here. The requirement of an uncaused cause is not one of them. I agree with that.
Regarding the first, infinite applies to time. If the chain of universes can remain constant through equation of matter and energy then it would require no intervention to keep going. It would continue infinitely when not disturbed. And if something can be imagined infinitely through the future then it is imaginable that it could be infinite through the past. Its infinite.
Second, there are agnostics that find scientific explanations more plausible, and agnostics that find spiritual explanations more plausible.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thnk the latter you accuse of being atheist. Though the atheist and the science-leaning agnostic might agree on many things, one claims certainty and the other doesn't. I think that is a profound difference.
Ask Dawkins, probably one of the most well-known atheists, if he claims certainty in his beliefs about God. He doesn't. And I think this is a common misconception about atheists.
Atheism just means you don't believe in God(s). It doesn't mean you rule out the possibility entirely, just that you find it improbable, given the evidence. If decent evidence did came along, you would know doubt re-evaluate your beliefs.
ps: Paladin, I will get around to replying to your thoughtful responses as soon as I can. However, I'm currently moving house so it may not be as quick as usual.
Oliver, I never said with immutable certainty. There are plenty of converts between Atheism and Theism. Everybody believes in something before they believe in something else. That is human nature.
I think we are getting into semantics, not substance. Doubt and certainty both have degrees. When contrasting atheists and agnostics, these differences are often stark. Having a shadow of a doubt (or even more) as a atheist is not the same thing as being an agnostic. And there is no shortage of atheist that have no doubt whatsoever.
Sorry for the delay, y'all.... I've taken some time to celebrate my anniversary, then my wife's birthday (3 days later), and then we have to pick up our kitty from the vet (tooth extraction); I'll try to reply ASAP... though it may be slow going, since this week is packed.
Paladin,
"Honestly, John... no offense taken, but are you at all capable of conversing without recourse to scoffing, sarcasm, and "acerbic wit"? Try it, sometime... civility and graciousness are useful skills to have."
Maybe so, but I don't see you exhibiting such skills. Witness the smug, condescending tone of your post above.
You say you deplore arguments devoid of logic, but I certainly don't see how the leap from "an uncaused cause" to a "supremely perfect God"--ignoring for the moment the illogic of "supremely perfect" as opposed to "perfect"--is any way logical.
"...Summary: that which is self-existent, unique, eternal (i.e. beyond space and time), enjoys the fullness of existence, is identical with existence itself, and is unlimited in every substantial way would, in fact, be supremely perfect. You'll have to explain why, apart from personal taste, you don't think so."
I'd like to, but I don't find your proof of God exactly accessible. I prefer Aquinas, the Kalam cosmological argument, or any of other first cause arguments I can actually follow. (I certainly don't mean that as criticism--I'm no philosopher and a sometimes lazy reader).
But just to start this off: I don't see how "1) No object can be its own cause" is self-evident. To my untrained mind, that seems like an appeal to common sense, not logic. Object? Maybe. But what about events? Granted, they may not be logicians, but the physicists tell us that many atomic and subatomic events have no discernible cause and are indeed random. Of course, that doesn't mean they don't have a cause, just that we can't discern it. On the other hand, I don't know if logic solves the issue: echoing Hume, to say that everything must have a cause may just be a habit of mind. In any event, saying that everything must have a cause is no way empirical.
If the Big Bang did indeed cause our universe (I won't say create), how do our notions of cause and effect have any relevance to what happened before the existence of time and space?
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